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joey tsu-yi chen* 
Green SOX for Investors: Requiring Companies to 
Disclose Risks Related to Climate Change 
i. introduction 
Before aig and lehman brothers rocked the global economy,1 Enron and 
WorldCom changed the face of corporate accounting and financial reporting in 
corporate America.2 With the subsequent enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
July 2002,3 congressional legislators directed federal regulators to give greater 
attention to the quality of corporate disclosures to investors and to the general 
public.4 Sarbanes-Oxley, or “SOX,” introduced important changes in financial 
reporting, corporate governance, accountability, and enforcement.5 Since its 
passage, SOX has essentially redefined corporate accounting practices and 
transparency, but has produced mixed results in the marketplace.6 Nevertheless, its 

© 2010 Joey Tsu-Yi Chen. 
 *  J.D. Candidate 2010, University of Maryland School of Law; M.S., University of Rochester School of 
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 1. See Susanne Craig et al., AIG, Lehman Shock Hits World Markets, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, at A1 
(reporting that the downfall of Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, two of Wall Street’s biggest firms, and AIG 
“sent markets across the globe tumbling”). 
 2. See C. William Thomas, Enron and Beyond: What’s the ‘WorldCom’ing to?, CPA J., Jan. 2003, at 8, 11 
(noting that in the aftermath of the scandals, the U.S. economy was likely to see tighter regulation and 
additional costs for audits and public oversight). The Enron and WorldCom scandals ultimately cost investors 
billions of dollars in losses and led to thousands of Americans losing their jobs. Elizabeth A. Nowicki, 10(b) or 
Not 10(b)?: Yanking the Security Blanket for Attorneys in Securities Litigation, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 637, 712 
n.286. 
 3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 4. See Onnig H. Dombalagian, Choice of Law and Capital Markets Regulation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1903, 1926 
(2008). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was Congress’s immediate response to the Enron and WorldCom scandals. 
Catherine Shakespeare, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Five Years on: What Have We Learned?, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 
333, 333 (2008).  
 5. See generally Byron F. Egan, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Its Expanding Reach, 40 TEX. J. BUS. L. 305, 309 
(2005) (providing a detailed overview of the scope and provisions of SOX). 
 6. LARA BERGEN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 AND ITS EFFECTS ON AMERICAN BUSINESS (2005), 
http://www.financialforum.umb.edu/documents/Sarbanes-Oxley.pdf. 
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importance has been compared to the Securities Act of 19337 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 19348.9 
SOX, with its call for greater transparency in corporate disclosures, also carried 
implications for corporate environmental matters.10 Although companies were 
already required under existing federal laws and regulations to disclose certain 
environmental costs and liabilities,11 SOX requires corporate officers to personally 
certify that their companies have controls and procedures in place to ensure the 
disclosure of material environmental information.12 Such internal controls can 
significantly impact adequate disclosure of environmental risks.13 Environmental 
risks have widespread relevance across numerous American business sectors given 
the increased global attention to climate change, greater large-scale efforts to 
combat its effects, pending congressional legislation concerning the regulation of 

 7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006). 
 8. Id. §§ 78a–78kk. 
 9. Peter Ferola, The Role of Audit Committees in the Wake of Corporate Federalism: Sarbanes-Oxley’s Creep 
into State Corporate Law, 7 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 143, 143 (2007) (“The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . 
brought about one of the most sweeping reforms since the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 during the New Deal administration.” (footnote omitted)). SOX amends both 
the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act. Egan, supra note 5, at 309. SOX focuses on four goals: 
(1) [I]mproving the “tone at the top” by requiring CEOs and CFOs to certify financial statements; 
(2) remedying the complex reporting and inadequate accounting methods that hid critical 
information; (3) improving corporate internal controls and auditor performance; and (4) creating a 
tougher enforcement environment by enhancing penalties and adding investigatory personnel at 
the SEC. 
J. Travis Laster & Michelle D. Morris, How to Avoid a Collision Between the Delaware Annual Meeting 
Requirement and the Federal Proxy Rules, 10 DEL. L. REV. 213, 245 (2008). SOX expands the SEC’s mandate to 
include “fighting fraud through corporate governance reform.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Jeffrey Y. Wu, Revisiting Business Roundtable and Section 19(c) in the Wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 23 YALE J. 
ON REG. 249, 249 (2006)). 
 10. Francis X. Lyons, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Changing Face of Environmental Liability Disclosure 
Obligations, ABA TRENDS, Nov./Dec. 2003, at 10, 11 (discussing the potential changes in environmental 
disclosure requirements for companies under SOX’s requirement “that corporate officers certify that adequate 
controls and procedures are in place to accurately disclose material changes in a company’s financial condition 
or results of operations”). 
 11. See infra Part II.A. For example, as discussed later in Part II, SEC regulations required companies to 
disclose any pending environmentally related legal proceedings outside the course of ordinary routine litigation 
incidental to business dealings. 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2009). Thus, a company had to disclose environmental 
proceedings wherein the company anticipated that the government could impose fines in excess of $100,000. 
Jeff A. Jones, Financial Disclosure Requirements for Hazardous Waste Liabilities, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 137, 142 
(1999). On February 8, 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) issued an interpretive guidance 
(“Release”) to assist public companies with disclosing material information related to climate change 
developments. See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act 
Release No. 9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61,469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,290 (Feb. 8, 2010). The Release does not 
purport to create new requirements or modify existing ones; rather, it raises contexts under which affected 
companies should conduct a materiality analysis for the purposes of disclosure. See infra Part II.C.   
 12. See 15 U.S.C. § 7241; Lyons, supra note 10, at 10. 
 13. See Lyons, supra note 10, at 11 (“Companies will put themselves at great risk if they do not have 
adequate internal systems in place to make an appropriate determination of potential environmental costs and 
liabilities and the need for disclosure of this information.”). 
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greenhouse gases, and consumer-driven, pro-environment awareness.14 Yet despite 
SOX, federal reporting requirements are a low bar to which public companies must 
hold themselves accountable for such risks.15 For example, a recent study 
commissioned by the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies 
(“Ceres”) and the Environmental Defense Fund revealed “limited” disclosure of 
risks related to climate change in 100 global companies in five sectors targeted for a 
low-carbon future.16 Such risks include: (1) physical risk from climate change; (2) 
regulatory risks related to greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions limits; and (3) 
litigation risks.17 Now that courts have begun to allow interested parties to bring 
lawsuits related to global warming,18 more and more American companies are likely 
to face significant costs, liabilities, and risks arising out of environmental issues.19 
There is a strong policy argument in favor of communicating corporate 
environmental risks, in addition to other risks affecting corporate financial 
performance and sustainability, to “Joe the Investor” to permit Joe to process and 

 14. See Katayun I. Jaffari, SEC Reporting Companies: Are Your Disclosures About Climate Change Risks 
Adequate?, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 28, 2009, at 7 (noting that climate change remains a “critical issue in the 
United States and across the globe[,]” dominating headlines and “affecting companies and business 
environments throughout the world”). 
 15. See infra Part V.A. 
 16. THE CORPORATE LIBRARY, CLIMATE RISK DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS: AN ANALYSIS OF 10-K REPORTING 
BY OIL AND GAS, INSURANCE, COAL, TRANSPORTATION AND ELECTRIC POWER COMPANIES 34 (2009), available at 
http://www.ceres.org/Document.Doc?id=473. A low-carbon future implies structuring an economy supported 
by cleaner, more efficient and sustainable energy in order to reduce carbon dioxide and other GHG emissions 
and mitigate the effects of climate change. See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, TOWARDS A LOW CARBON FUTURE: 
SCIENTIFIC DISCUSSION MEETING 1 (2009).  
 17. THE CORPORATE LIBRARY, supra note 16, at 2–3. 
 18. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007); Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855, 
859–60 (5th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted en banc, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010); Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 
582 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 19. See Jaffari, supra note 14, (“[C]ompanies must grapple with the key issues that climate change poses: 
financial risks, opportunities and potential costs, as well as physical risks to corporate facilities and 
operations.”); David B.H. Martin, A New Season for Environmental Risk Factors and Related Disclosures, in 41ST 
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION, at 979, 981 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook 
Series No. 1773, 2009); see also Comer, 585 F.3d at 859–60 (reversing the lower court’s dismissal of the case on 
the basis of standing and, thus, allowing the fourteen class action plaintiffs to bring their common law claims 
against defendant industries for compensatory and punitive damages). On February 26, 2010, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided to rehear the case en banc, vacating the three-member panel decision. 
Comer, 598 F.3d at 210. The court recently dismissed the en banc hearing, canceling oral arguments for lack of 
quorum to hear the case en banc. Global Environmental Law, http://globalenvironmentallaw.blogspot.com/ 
2010/05/gulf-oil-spill-comer-en-banc-dismissed.html (May 2, 2010, 11:53). Presumably, a dismissal of the 
appeal for reasons other than on the merits of the case will likely lead to an appeal to the Supreme Court. See id. 
Interestingly, the plaintiffs in Comer seek to recover solely monetary damages, not equitable relief. Comer, 585 
F.3d at 859–60. While courts have yet to decide a global warming lawsuit involving private parties on the merits, 
corporate defendants still incur significant costs in the defense. Jennifer Koons, Courts Follow Landmark 2nd 
Circuit Ruling with 2 Greenhouse Gas Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/ 
10/19/19greenwire-courts-follow-landmark-2nd-circuit-ruling-with-62336.html?pagewanted=1. Furthermore, 
the lawsuits themselves may encourage additional common law-based global warming litigation. Id.  
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use this information in his decision-making.20 Additionally, the heightened interest 
in shareholder access in recent years suggests one possible means by which investors 
can effect changes in social policy—through corporate governance.21 In late-
October 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) advanced 
shareholder interest in corporate governance when it announced that shareholder 
resolutions may inquire into major social policy issues, from climate change to 
subprime lending.22 The decision reversed the agency’s previous policy that allowed 
companies to exclude “shareholder resolutions requesting information on the 
financial risks associated with environmental, human rights and other social issues 
facing companies.”23 
Within the business community, the impact of environmental risks on American 
companies can range from tangible liabilities, such as lawsuit damages from 
hazardous waste litigation and public nuisance,24 to unquantifiable complexities, 
such as uncertainties associated with climate change.25 For example, with more than 
half of our electricity coming from coal-fired power plants, the anticipated 
regulation of carbon dioxide emissions and other greenhouse gases (from burning 
of fossil fuels) will substantially impact American energy and utility companies.26 In 

 20. See Steven L. Bray, Comment, Sealing the Conceptual Cracks in the SEC’s Environmental Disclosure 
Rules: A Risk Communication Approach, 18 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 655, 656 (1997) (noting the fundamental 
purpose of environmental disclosure “is to achieve a nation’s public policy goals through the communication of 
environmental risk to the public” such that the public can use this information and act on it).  
 21. Thomas Joo, Global Warming and the Management-Centered Corporation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 
671 (2009). 
 22. SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14E (CF) (Oct. 27, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
interps/legal/cfslb14e.htm.  
 23. Posting to Corporate Disclosure Alert, http://corporatedisclosurealert.blogspot.com/ (Oct. 27, 2009, 
6:21 EST). 
 24. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that plaintiff 
states, New York City, and environmental groups had standing to allege a common law public nuisance cause of 
action against five of the nation’s largest coal-burning utility companies for their unchecked greenhouse gas 
emissions and supposed contributions to global warming); Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l., Inc., 399 
F.3d 248, 252 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming the lower court’s judgment requiring a chemical manufacturer to 
excavate over one million tons of hexavalent chromium waste). 
 25. Richenda Connell et al., Evaluating the Private Sector Perspective on the Financial Risks of Climate 
Change, 15 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y/HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 133, 135 
(2009) (“The challenges to an integrated assessment of the risks and opportunities arising from climate change 
lie in great part in a number of underlying uncertainties. Further complicating the matter is that much of the 
climate change modeling produces forecasts for outcomes several decades hence.”). 
 26. On December 15, 2009, the EPA published a final ruling of endangerment, finding that CO2 and five 
other GHGs “taken in combination endanger both the public health and the public welfare of current and 
future generations.” Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496,  66,496–97 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.). The 
EPA has since issued a rule requiring the mandatory reporting of GHGs by specific industry sectors. See 
Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, 56,260 (Oct. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts 86, 87, 89, 90, 94, 98, 1033, 1039, 1042, 1045, 1048, 1051, 1054, 1065). Congressional legislators have 
also proposed a national cap-and-trade system for mitigating GHG emissions. American Clean Energy and 
Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 701(b) (2009). Additionally, several states have initiated efforts 
to reduce GHG emissions and combat climate change. THE CORPORATE LIBRARY, supra note 16, at 2. 
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light of these risks, what should a company disclose in its financial reports? What 
must a company disclose? These questions lead to the central issue of whether the 
United States employs an environmental risk disclosure system that adequately 
protects consumer and investor interests in the face of shifting financial, legal, and 
environmental issues related to climate change.27 
While public confidence in the federal financial regulatory system has suffered in 
the wake of corporate scandals and the recent credit crisis, other nations seem to do 
a better job of equipping investors for dealing with evolving environmental risks.28 
For example, the European Union (“E.U.”) has adopted a “precautionary principle” 
approach toward its environmental policy,29 which serves as the basis for its risk 
regulation.30 Likewise, companies may elect to participate in the E.U.’s voluntary 
corporate environmental reporting system aimed at promoting companies that 
demonstrate “superior environmental performance.”31 Finally, the E.U. operates a 
trading scheme for GHG emission allowances whereby large industrial emitters of 
GHGs are required to monitor and report their GHG emissions.32 These programs 
appear to offer both socially conscious investors and the general public a greater 
degree of transparency than the U.S. system. 
This Comment examines corporate disclosure requirements under current U.S. 
reporting standards with respect to environmental risks associated with climate 
change and concludes that current federal securities laws fail to ensure adequate 
environmental risk disclosure. Section II gives a brief account of environmental 
reporting obligations in the United States.33 Section III outlines the legal basis and 
regulatory framework for the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) 
mandatory reporting rule for GHG emissions and other early initiatives aimed 
towards regulating GHG emissions.34 Section IV briefly summarizes the 
environmental reporting scheme employed by the E.U.35 Finally, Section V discusses 
the purpose and merits for heightened disclosure of environmental risks, using 

 27. See infra Part V. 
 28. See infra Part IV. 
 29. Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the Comparison and Evolution of Risk 
Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 207, 209–10 (2003). For an explanation of the “precautionary 
principle,” see id. at 210 n.11. Briefly, the precautionary principle refers to the principle of adopting 
precautionary measures, such as regulations, “to prevent an uncertain future risk in advance of complete 
evidence about the risk.” Id. In other words, preventative actions are not postponed for lack of full scientific 
certainty. Id.  
 30. See id. at 209–11. 
 31. See William L. Thomas, The Green Nexus: Financiers and Sustainable Development, 13 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 899, 917–18 (2001).  
 32. Council Directive 2003/87/EC, Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Within 
the Community and Amending Council Directive 96/61/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 28, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2003L0087:20090625:EN:PDF. 
 33. See infra Part II. 
 34. See infra Part III. 
 35. See infra Part IV. 
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climate change as an example context, and presents an argument for statutory 
requirements to promote this reform.36 This Comment adopts the position that 
Congress should amend SOX to require heightened environmental disclosure 
requirements with regard to climate change risks.37 Specifically, SOX should require 
that public companies disclose their GHG emissions.38 Additionally, SOX should be 
amended to direct the SEC and EPA to formalize an agreement to share 
information and improve the coordination between the two agencies.39 
ii. u.s. financial reporting requirements for environmental matters 
Since the 1930s, Congress has enacted numerous provisions aimed at protecting the 
American investor.40 With the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Congress established 
the SEC,41 the federal agency responsible for administering several federal laws, 
including the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and 
SOX.42 The SEC has the legal authority to establish and enforce standards 
concerning financial accounting, reporting, and disclosure.43 Historically, however, 
the SEC has relied on the private sector, namely the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (“FASB”), to promulgate rules and guidelines for financial reporting.44 The 
SEC identifies emerging financial reporting issues and refers these issues to FASB, 
which sets the appropriate accounting standards but does not have any enforcement 
authority.45 The SEC then uses its authority to enforce the FASB standards.46 While 
an in-depth discussion of the nearly 170 FASB statements exceeds the scope of this 
Comment, one rule in particular, Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 
5 (“SFAS 5”) provides: 

 36. See infra Part V. 
 37. See infra Part VI. 
 38. See infra Part VI.B. 
 39. See infra Part VI.B. 
 40. See Albert J. Matricciani, Jr., Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.: 
Substitution of Congressional Intent with Caveat Emptor, 4 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 187, 188–89 (2009).  
 41. 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006). 
 42. 69 AM. JUR. 2D Securities Regulation–Federal § 1 (2008). 
 43. CLYDE P. STICKNEY & ROMAN L. WEIL, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING: AN INTRODUCTION TO CONCEPTS, 
METHODS AND USES 21 (11th ed. 2006). 
 44. FASB, Facts About FASB, http://www.fasb.org/facts/ (last visited May 19, 2010). 
 45. The Roles of the SEC and the FASB in Establishing GAAP: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital 
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong. 
(2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/051402tsrkh.htm (statement of Robert K. Herdman, Chief 
Accountant, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission). 
 46. See 15 U.S.C. § 77s (authorizing the SEC to make and enforce rules and regulations concerning 
corporate financial reporting). The statute also permits the Commission to recognize “any accounting 
principles established by a standard setting body.” Id. § 77s(b). 
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An estimated loss from a loss contingency47 . . . shall be accrued by a charge 
to income if . . . [i]nformation available prior to issuance of the financial 
statements indicates that it is probable that an asset had been impaired or a 
liability had been incurred at the date of the financial statements . . . [and] 
[t]he amount of loss can be reasonably estimated. If no accrual is made for 
a loss contingency [under the aforementioned conditions] . . . disclosure of 
the contingency shall be made when there is at least a reasonable possibility 
that a loss or an additional loss may have been incurred.48 
Essentially, SFAS 5 requires the disclosure of environmental liabilities as loss 
contingencies if a company incurs and can reasonably estimate losses arising from 
environmental liabilities or risks.49 Thus, for example, a chemical company would 
be required to disclose loss contingencies related to hazardous waste cleanup if the 
company is classified as a potentially responsible party for a Superfund site.50 Apart 
from accounting standards, such as SFAS 5, which prompts disclosure of 
environmental loss contingencies, regulations directly issued by the SEC also 
require disclosure of material information related to environmental compliance and 
governmental action pursued thereto.51 
A. Environmental Disclosure Requirements Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley 
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 direct 
publicly registered companies to disclose three types of environmentally related 
information in their financial filings with the SEC.52 They include: (1) material 
effects of the registrant’s compliance with environmental laws and regulations;53 (2) 

 47. FASB defines a contingency as “an existing condition, situation, or set of circumstances involving 
uncertainty as to possible gain . . . or loss . . . to an enterprise that will ultimately be resolved when one or more 
future events occur or fail to occur.” FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS NO. 5: ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES 4 (1975). 
 48. Id. at 5–6. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Jones, supra note 11, at 160–61 (describing an SEC cease and desist order issued against Lee 
Pharmaceutical for material misrepresentations in its financial statements). In 1998, the SEC took action against 
Lee Pharmaceutical, charging the company with failure to accrue and disclose material estimates of its 
environmental liabilities and cleanup costs concerning its designation as a potentially responsible party for a 
Superfund hazardous waste contamination site. Id. at 159–60. 
 51. See infra Part II.A. 
 52. For an overview of corporate disclosure requirements regarding environmental matters, see Richard M. 
Schwartz & Donna Mussio, Environmental Disclosure Requirements Under the Federal Securities Laws, in 
CONDUCTING DUE DILIGENCE IN M&A AND SECURITIES OFFERINGS 2009, at 259 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, 
Course Handbook Series No. 1746, 2009) [hereinafter Schwartz & Mussio, Environmental Disclosure]. 
 53. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(xii) (2009) (requiring the registrant to disclose the material costs of complying, 
or failing to comply, with federal, state, or local provisions regarding pollution discharge or related to the 
protection of the environment). 
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pending material environmental legal proceedings;54 and (3) discussion and analysis 
of the registrant’s financial condition and contingent liabilities in financial 
statements.55 These environmental disclosure requirements are commonly referred 
to as Items 101, 103, and 303 (respectively) of the SEC’s Regulation S-K.56 
Regulation S-K also includes Item 503(c), which requires companies registering 
with the SEC to disclose in their Prospectus summaries “the most significant factors 
that make the offering speculative or risky,” although the enumerated risk factors 
do not specifically include, but leave open for consideration, environmental risks.57 
Materiality becomes the operative word when corporate managers decide 
whether to disclose environmental costs, liabilities, or risks under Regulation S-K.58 
Item 101 requires a company to disclose “the material effects . . . [of complying] 
with Federal, State and local . . . [laws] which have been enacted or adopted 
regulating the discharge of materials into the environment, or otherwise relating to 
the protection of the environment . . . .”59 Likewise with Item 103, a company must 
include a description of “any material pending legal proceedings, other than 
ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business, to which the registrant or any 
of its subsidiaries is a party . . . .”60 While Item 101 clearly calls for disclosure of the 
material effects of environmental compliance on a company’s capital expenditures, 
earnings, and competitive position,61 Item 103 arguably applies to environmental 
liabilities on the assumption that environmental litigation falls outside the sphere of 
ordinary routine litigation.62 

 54. Id. § 229.103 (requiring the registrant to disclose proceedings outside the course of ordinary routine 
litigation incidental to the business). 
 55. Id. § 229.303 (requiring the registrant to disclose environmentally related contingencies in the 
Management’s Discussion and Analysis, including known trends or demands, events, and uncertainties that are 
likely to have a material effect on the registrant’s operational income and potential liability). 
 56. Richard M. Schwartz & Donna Mussio, Environmental Due Diligence for Securities Offerings, in 
CONDUCTING DUE DILIGENCE IN M&A AND SECURITIES OFFERINGS 2009, at 229, 239 (PLI Corporate Law & 
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 1746, 2009) [hereinafter Schwartz & Mussio, Due Diligence].  
 57. 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c). In its recent interpretive guidance, the SEC recommends that companies refrain 
from disclosing generic risks. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 
Securities Act Release No. 9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61,469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,290, 6,296 (Feb. 8, 2010). 
Instead, companies should consider disclosing only “specific risks they face as a result of climate change 
legislation or regulation.” Id.  
 58. See David Monsma & Timothy Olson, Muddling Through Counterfactual Materiality and Divergent 
Disclosure: The Necessary Search for a Duty to Disclose Material Non-Financial Information, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 
137, 147 (2007) (“The threshold question under securities law for any reporting decision is whether 
information is ‘material.’”). 
 59. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii) (emphasis added). 
 60. Id. § 229.103. (emphasis added). 
 61. Id. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii). 
 62. Gregory A. Bibler & Christopher P. Davis, Disclosing Environmental Liabilities in the Wake of Sarbanes-
Oxley, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Apr. 2003, at 2 (“Environmental litigation is categorically not ‘ordinary’ 
or ‘routine.’”). Moreover, according to the SEC, actions contemplated by government authorities also fall 
within the ambit of Item 103. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. 
Reg. at 6,293 (citing Instruction 5 to Item 103). 
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How does one define what is “material”? The Supreme Court of the United 
States considered the definition of materiality and established a standard for 
materiality in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.63 The Court held that a fact may 
be considered “material” if “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”64 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Marshall explained that the purpose of the materiality standard “is 
not merely to ensure by judicial means that the transaction . . . is fair and otherwise 
adequate, but to ensure disclosures by corporate management in order to enable the 
shareholders to make an informed choice.”65 In so holding, the Court cautioned 
against setting a standard for materiality that was unnecessarily low, which would 
unduly burden both the shareholder and company.66 Instead, the Court looked to 
whether there was a substantial likelihood that the omitted fact, in the eyes of a 
reasonable investor, would have changed the “total mix of information made 
available.”67 
Item 303 of Regulation S-K calls for discussion of various segments of a 
company’s business and provides guidance for inclusion of a Management 
Discussion and Analysis (“MD&A”) section.68 In their SEC filings, companies are 
required to include an MD&A section in which they must discuss and analyze 
trends, demands, commitments, events, and uncertainties that, in the 
management’s judgment, are reasonably likely to materially impact a company’s 
liquidity, financial condition, or operating results.69 Known trends and uncertainties 
may include environmental risks, though Item 303 does not specifically state that 
these risks must be discussed in this section.70 Rather, the decision to include 

 63. 426 U.S. 438, 443–44, 449 (1976). In TSC Industries, the plaintiff challenged a joint proxy statement 
issued by the defendant companies, alleging that it was incomplete and materially misleading. Id. at 440–41. 
National Industries had acquired TSC Industries and placed five of its own members on the TSC board of 
directors. Id. at 440. The new board subsequently voted to liquidate and sell off TSC’s assets. Id. at 440–41. The 
plaintiff, a TSC shareholder, objected, claiming the companies’ joint proxy statement failed to disclose the 
extent of National’s control over the TSC board. Id. at 441–42. The Supreme Court concluded the alleged 
omissions were not material as to warrant granting summary judgment, as the additional facts concerning the 
board’s new membership were not “so obviously important that reasonable minds could not differ on their 
materiality.” Id. at 452–53. 
 64. Id. at 449. The Supreme Court has since upheld the definition of “materiality” in subsequent cases. See 
Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1090 (1991); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 
(1988). 
 65. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 448. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 449 (quotation marks omitted). 
 68. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2009).  
 69. Id. 
 70. See ROBERT REPETTO & DUNCAN AUSTIN, COMING CLEAN: CORPORATE DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIALLY 
SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS 7 (Kathleen Lynch ed., 2000) (“Disclosure requirements of known 
uncertainties under Item 303 of Regulation S-K could reasonably apply to environmental uncertainties.”). 
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environmental matters centers on what corporate mangers determine to be 
“material.”71 
B. Disclosure Requirements Under Sarbanes-Oxley 
In the wake of a series of high-profile corporate and accounting scandals, Congress 
enacted SOX.72 SOX includes statutory provisions for heightened corporate 
responsibility and accountability, which were intended to increase the quality of 
corporate financial reporting.73 For example, section 302 of SOX binds the 
signatures of corporate officers to the truthfulness of the company’s financial 
statements.74 In essence, SOX requires that a company’s highest executives attest to 
the accuracy of each corporate SEC filing, certifying that they “personally reviewed 
their companies’ controls and procedures to . . . disclose material changes in 
financial conditions and results of company operations, including expectations of 
future performance.”75 SOX did not, however, expand a company’s duty to disclose 
beyond those costs and liabilities that were material,76 and the SEC has since upheld 
the TSC Industries’ “reasonable investor” test.77 
SOX also directed the SEC to adopt amendments to the MD&A requirements.78 
The SEC later proposed expanding MD&A disclosure provisions to include rules 

 71. Id. (“Disclosure of environmental exposures is governed both by the SEC’s core rules on materiality 
and by specific requirements regarding environmental liabilities and compliance with federal and state 
environmental regulations.”). 
 72. Allison Fass, One Year Later, the Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley, FORBES.COM, July 22, 2003, http:// 
www.forbes.com/2003/07/22/cz_af_0722sarbanes.html. Congress enacted SOX immediately in response to a 
wave of corporate accounting scandals that included giants such as Enron and WorldCom. See supra note 2. 
Those scandals “exposed weaknesses in corporate governance, audit practices, and financial reporting.” U.S. 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 401(C) OF THE SARBANES-
OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON ARRANGEMENTS WITH OFF-BALANCE SHEET IMPLICATIONS, SPECIAL PURPOSE ENTITIES, 
AND TRANSPARENCY OF FILINGS BY ISSUERS 1 (2005). 
 73. Egan, supra note 5, at 309 (stating that SOX aimed to protect investors “by improving the accuracy and 
reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws”). 
 74. Section 302 provides: “[B]ased on such officer’s knowledge, the financial statements, and other 
financial information included in the report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition and 
results of operations of the issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in the report . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(3) 
(2006) (emphasis added). 
 75. Bibler & Davis, supra note 62, at 1. 
 76. Id. at 2. 
 77. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act Release No. 
9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61,469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,290, 6,292–93 (Feb. 8, 2010) (upholding the TSC 
Industries materiality standard where “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider 
it important in deciding how to vote or make an investment decision”); see infra Part II.C. 
 78. Isobel A. Jones, Management’s Discussion and Analysis in SEC Related Documents, in PREPARATION OF 
ANNUAL DISCLOSURE DOCUMENTS 2008, at 421, 428 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series 
No. 1640, 2008) (“SEC adopted amendments to the MD&A requirements mandating specific disclosure 
concerning off-balance sheet arrangements and contractual obligations . . . .”). Section 401(c) of SOX required 
the SEC to conduct a study and report inter alia any recommendations for “improving the transparency and 
quality of reporting off-balance sheet transactions in the financial statements and disclosures required to be 
filed by an issuer with the Commission.” 15 U.S.C. § 7261(c).  
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related to off-balance sheet arrangements, contractual obligations, and contingent 
liabilities and commitments.79 With regard to specific environmental disclosures, 
such as GHG emissions, however, the restriction of materiality, as evaluated under 
the reasonable investor test, continues to limit the extent to which corporate entities 
must disclose the environmental effects of their operations and products.80 
Shortly after SOX’s enactment, some practitioners argued that SOX’s 
requirement that corporate executives personally certify their company’s internal 
controls and procedures changed the context for Regulation S-K’s environmental 
disclosure requirements.81 That senior executives and counsel could be held 
personally accountable for the accuracy of these internal controls purportedly 
prompted companies to “reevaluate their procedures for estimating and disclosing 
environmental compliance costs and liabilities.”82 Companies were now “on notice 
that they should be able to point to an established protocol for identifying, tracking, 
quantifying, and assessing the materiality of environmental matters.”83 
C. SEC Interpretive Guidance on Disclosures Related to Climate Change 
Earlier this year, in response to several calls for greater guidance on corporate 
environmental disclosures, the SEC issued an interpretive release (“Release”) 
concerning corporate disclosures related to climate change.84 At a January 27, 2010 
open Commission meeting, SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro expressly noted that the 
“interpretive release . . . does not create new legal requirements or modify existing 
ones—it is merely intended to provide clarity and enhance consistency.”85 In 
addition to summarizing existing disclosure requirements under federal law,86 the 
release reinforces the SEC’s adoption of the long-standing TSC Industries 

 79. GOODWIN PROCTER, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002: SEC PROPOSES NEW MD&A DISCLOSURE RULES 
RELATING TO OFF-BALANCE SHEET ARRANGEMENTS, CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS AND CONTINGENT LIABILITIES 
AND COMMITMENTS 2–4 (2002). Pursuant to section 401(c) of SOX, the SEC conducted a study of off-balance 
sheet arrangements to determine whether corporate financial statements “transparently reflect[ed] the 
economics of off-balance sheet arrangements.” U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N., supra note 72, at 1. The 
Commission defined “off-balance sheet” to include “investments in the equity of other entities, transfers of 
financial assets . . . , certain retirement arrangements, leases, contingent obligations and guarantees, derivatives, 
and other contractual obligations . . . .” Id.  
 80. See David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and 
Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 408 (2005) (noting that the SEC views the economic materiality 
standard as a filter limiting information disclosure).  
 81. Bibler & Davis, supra note 62, at 2. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act Release No. 
9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61,469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,290 (Feb. 8, 2010). 
 85. Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement Before the Open Commission 
Meeting on Disclosure Related to Business or Legislative Events on the Issue of Climate Change (Jan. 27, 2010), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch012710mls-climate.htm. 
 86. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. at 6,293–95. 
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materiality standard,87 and reiterates the two-step process for determining “the 
materiality of known trends, events or uncertainties,” previously described in a 
1989 Release.88 Accordingly, company managers must first ask whether the trend, 
demand, commitment, event or, uncertainty (collectively, “event”) is reasonably 
likely to occur.89 If not, then management need not disclose.90 On the other hand, if 
management cannot determine the likelihood of such an occurrence, then 
management must presume the event will occur, and it must disclose any material 
effect the event will likely have on the company’s financial condition.91 
Specifically with regard to climate change-related disclosures, the February 2010 
release describes examples of climate change developments which may trigger 
material disclosures.92 For example, pending federal legislation regulating GHG 
emissions under a cap and trade system may require companies directly affected by 
this action—e.g., energy and utility companies—to disclose their regulatory risks 
following the prescribed two-step materiality analysis.93 Affected companies may 
need to disclose: 
-Costs related to the trading of emissions allowances or credits;94 
-Compliance costs associated with facility and equipment upgrades to 
reduce GHG emissions;95 
-Changes in profits or losses reflecting changes in consumer demand as a 
result of the legislation.96 
The SEC also recommends that companies affected by foreign treaties and 
international accords (concerning climate change) should consider disclosing the 
material impact these laws may have on their businesses.97 
The Release recognizes that climate change developments may indirectly affect 
registered companies through shifting business and consumer trends that create 
either new opportunities or new risks.98 Consequently, these businesses may be 
required to disclose risks related to: 
-Decreased demand for certain carbon-intensive goods;99 
-Increased competition to develop innovative new, “cleaner” products;100 

 87. Id. at 6,292–93.  
 88. Id. at 6,295.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 6,295–96.  
 94. Id. at 6,296. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. 
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-Shifting consumer demand from carbon-based energy (and related 
services) towards alternative energy.101 
Finally, the physical manifestations of a changing climate may bear significant 
consequences for a company’s operations.102 For example, changes in severe weather 
and the availability of natural resources can disrupt manufacturing and distribution 
processes, leading to financial losses or increased liabilities.103 According to the SEC, 
businesses vulnerable to the physical consequences of climate change “should 
consider disclosing material risks . . . in their publicly filed disclosure documents.”104 
Notably, the Release does not command disclosure for the listed climate change 
events. Rather, it presents situations that may compel a company to make a 
materiality determination before disclosure.105 
D. ASTM Standards for Environmental Disclosures 
It is worthwhile to mention two additional standards, albeit voluntary, whereby 
companies disclose environmental liabilities or contingencies. In 2002, the 
American Society of Testing and Materials (“ASTM”) adopted its own standards for 
estimating and disclosing environmental liabilities.106 The ASTM International is 
one of the world’s largest voluntary standards development organizations,107 
responsible for developing technical standards for a range of industry sectors.108 
Government agencies have either used ASTM standards in codes, regulations, and 
laws, or referred to them for guidance.109 
Individual organizations can apply ASTM standards to satisfy federal 
requirements for environmental site assessments.110 ASTM published standard guide 

 100. See id.; see also Am. Inst. Certified Pub. Accountants, News Highlights from April 2010, J. ACCT., Apr. 
2010, at 11, 11, available at http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2010/Apr/Highlights.htm (“In 
comments before the commission, Meredith Cross, director of the Division of Corporation Finance, said the 
guidance includes examples of indirect consequences such as . . . increased competition to develop innovative 
new products to satisfy demand for cleaner goods.”). 
 101. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. at 6296.  
 102. Id. at 6,296–97. 
 103. Id. at 6,297. 
 104. Id.  
 105. See id. at 6,295–97. 
 106. Bibler & Davis, supra note 62, at 3. 
 107. ASTM International, About ASTM International [hereinafter ASTM, About ASTM International] 
http://www.astm.org/ABOUT/aboutASTM.html (last visited May 19, 2010). ASTM is a trusted source with a 
reputation for producing high technical quality and market relevant standards for materials, products, systems, 
and services. Id. 
 108. Id. ASTM’s members represent “producers, users, consumers, government, and academia from over 
100 countries.” ASTM International, Standards Worldwide [hereinafter ASTM, Standards Worldwide] 
http://www.astm.org/FAQ/whatisastm_answers.html#anchor2 (last visited May 19, 2010). 
 109. See ASTM, Standards Worldwide, supra note 108. 
 110. Id. 
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E 2173 for disclosing environmental liabilities,111 as well as another guide for 
estimating the monetary costs and liabilities associated with environmental 
matters.112 Standard E 2173, which was intended to supplement SEC requirements 
and apply to MD&A disclosure of environmental liabilities,113 mandates specific 
minimum disclosure requirements when a company believes its “environmental 
liability for an individual circumstance or its environmental liability in the 
aggregate is material.”114 Although socially responsible groups have petitioned the 
SEC to formally adopt the ASTM standards as regulations, E 2173 remains only a 
voluntary industry guideline.115 
iii. federal regulation of greenhouse gas emissions 
In 2007, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Massachusetts v. EPA116 
and paved the way for the regulation of climate change.117 In a landmark 5-4 
decision, the Court concluded that the EPA has a duty under the Clean Air Act to 
regulate emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other GHGs from motor vehicles.
118 
In that case, a group of states, local governments, and private organizations alleged 
that the EPA failed to regulate the emissions of four GHGs, including carbon 
dioxide.119 In addition to finding petitioners had standing to sue,120 the Court 

 111. ASTM E 2173, http://www.astm.org/Standards/E2173.htm (last visited May 19, 2010). 
 112. ASTM E 2137, http://www.astm.org/Standards/E2137.htm (last visited May 19, 2010).  
 113. Ridgeway M. Hall, Jr., Policies, Regulations, and Guidelines Relating to Environmental Reporting and 
Disclosure and Auditing—Management Systems, in HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES, SITE REMEDIATION, AND 
ENFORCEMENT, at 195, 199 (ALI-ABA Continuing Legal Education, Oct. 2003).  
 114. Bibler & Davis, supra note 62, at 3 (original emphasis omitted). ASTM E 2173’s minimum disclosure 
requirements include: 
(1) the number of [Superfund] sites for which the company has been named as a [potentially 
responsible party (“PRP”)] and the number of claims, suits, actions, demands, requests for 
payment, notices, or cases that have been presented to the company; (2) an estimate of the 
company’s environmental liabilities and a description of the approach used to estimate those 
liabilities; (3) the cost estimation methodology employed by the company for accrued liabilities; (4) 
a characterization of any material loss contingencies; and (5) the nature and terms of cost-sharing 
arrangements with other PRPs. 
Id. at 3–4. 
 115. Schwartz & Mussio, Environmental Disclosure, supra note 52, at 320–22 (reporting that despite a 
petition by the Rose Foundation urging the SEC to adopt the language of the ASTM standards such as E 2173, 
the SEC has yet to take any action to make the standard mandatory). 
 116. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 117. See id. at 532 (concluding that EPA has the statutory authority to regulate GHG emissions). 
 118. Id. (concluding that CO2 and other greenhouse gases “fit well within the Clean Air Act’s capacious 
definition of  ‘air pollutant’” and, thus, may be regulated). 
 119. Id. at 505. 
 120. The lower court decided the case on the merits. Id. at 514. In a separate opinion concurring only in 
judgment, Judge Sentelle wrote that petitioners failed to allege particularized injuries from global warming, and 
thus did not satisfy the requirements for Article III standing. Id. at 514–15. On appeal, however, the Supreme 
Court found that the State of Massachusetts had standing to sue from the real risk of catastrophic harm, a risk 
of harm that could be reduced. Id. at 526.  
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recognized the harms associated with climate change and GHG emissions.121 The 
Court indicated that the EPA had a duty to mitigate or reduce emissions from 
motor vehicles, which make a meaningful contribution to climate change.122 Thus, 
the EPA’s failure to do so, without justification for its inaction, was arbitrary and 
capricious.123 In reaching this holding, the Court found that carbon dioxide and 
other notable GHGs qualified as “air pollutants” under the Clean Air Act.124 
On July 30, 2008, the EPA responded to the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Massachusetts v. EPA, as well as to numerous petitions for GHG regulation in the 
wake of the Court’s decision, by publishing a proposed rule regarding the 
regulation of GHG emissions such as carbon dioxide in certain industry sectors.125 
With the announcement, the EPA sought to solicit comments from other agencies 
and the general public on the best approach to tackle GHG emissions.126 That same 
year, the Consolidated Appropriations Act127 went into effect, which allocated 
federal funding for the EPA to “publish a draft rule . . . [requiring] mandatory 
reporting of [GHG] emissions above appropriate thresholds in all sectors of the 
[U.S.] economy.”128 In April 2009, the EPA formally classified carbon dioxide and 
five other GHGs as pollutants under the Clean Air Act.129 In early December 2009, 
the Administrator of the EPA signed two final findings concerning GHG 
emissions.130 First, the Administrator concluded that the six newly classified GHG 
pollutants pose a threat to the health and welfare of the general public.131 Second, 
the combined emissions of these gases “from new motor vehicles and new motor 
vehicle engines contribute to the [GHG] pollution which threatens public health 
and welfare.”132 

 121. Id. at 521. 
 122. Id. at 525. 
 123. Id. at 534. 
 124. Id. at 532. 
 125. Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354, 44,354 (proposed 
July 30, 2008) (noting that petitions to the EPA asked the agency to “regulate GHG emissions from ships, 
aircraft and nonroad vehicles such as farm and construction equipment”). 
 126. Id.  
 127. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007). 
 128. Id. at 2128. The EPA has since stated that “suppliers of fossil fuels or industrial greenhouse gases, 
manufacturers of vehicles and engines, and facilities that emit 25,000 metric tons or more per year of GHG 
emissions are required to submit annual reports to EPA.” EPA, Final Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse 
Gases Rule, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/ghgrulemaking.html (last visited May 19, 2010). 
 129. John M. Broder, E.P.A. Clears Way for Greenhouse Gas Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/18/science/earth/18endanger.html (noting that the EPA’s decision was based 
on scientific analysis that revealed unprecedented levels of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, 
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride, which were likely “responsible for an increase 
in average temperatures and other climate changes”). 
 130. U.S. EPA, Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under the Clean Air 
Act, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/endangerment.html (last visited May 19, 2010).  
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
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In light of such endangerment and contributory findings, the regulation of GHG 
emissions would soon follow. In April 2009, the EPA proposed to mandate 
“reporting of [GHG] emissions from all sectors of the economy,” including direct 
emitting sources and fossil fuel and industrial gas suppliers.133 After the notice and 
comment period for administrative rulemaking, the EPA finalized the rule on 
October 30, 2009.134 While the EPA’s mandatory reporting rule does not require 
companies to control or limit the emission of the six identified GHGs, it does 
require that affected facilities—e.g., fossil fuel electric-generating units, 
incinerators, crude petroleum extractors and refineries, plastic product 
manufacturers, pulp and paper mills, chemical manufacturers, mobile sources, and 
suppliers of GHGs135—account for all emissions of the listed GHGs above the 
prescribed threshold.136 For example, any facility that cumulatively emits 25,000 
metric tons of carbon dioxide-equivalent (or more) had to begin collecting data on 
its CO2 emissions in January 2010 and report every year thereafter.
137 
On May 13, 2010, the EPA announced a final rule addressing GHG emissions 
from the largest emitters of GHGs—stationary sources such as power plants and oil 
refineries.138 The rule adopts a “phased-in approach” to regulating GHGs under 
Title V of the Clean Air Act by establishing a threshold for GHG emissions above 
which stationary sources would be required to obtain a Clean Air Act operating 
permit.139 Beginning in January 2011, GHG permitting requirements will apply to 
large facilities already subject to Clean Air Act Title V permitting for non-GHG 
pollutants.140 Then in July 2011, the Title V permitting requirements for GHGs will 
extend to other large stationary emitters of GHGs.141 Under the new rule, regulated 

 133. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 16,448, 16,448 (proposed Apr. 10, 2009). 
 134. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260 (Oct. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts 86, 87, 89, 90, 94. 98, 1033, 1039, 1042, 1045, 1048, 1051, 1054, 1065). 
 135. EPA’s list of example facilities likely to be affected by the mandatory GHG reporting requirement is 
extensive. See id. at 56,260–61.  
 136. See id. at 56,266–67.  
 137. Id. at 56,267. 
 138. Press Release, U.S. EPA, EPA Sets Thresholds for Greenhouse Gas Permitting Requirements (May 13, 
2010), http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/Press_Releases_By_Date!OpenView (follow “05/13/201 EPA 
Sets Thresholds for Greenhouse Gas Permitting Requirements” hyperlink). EPA proposed the rule in October 
2009. See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 
55,292 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009).  
 139. U.S. EPA, FACT SHEET, FINAL RULE: PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION AND TITLE V 
GREENHOUSE GAS TAILORING RULE 1 (2010), http://www.epa.gov/nsr/documents/20100413fs.pdf. 
 140. Press Release, U.S. EPA, supra note 138. Under the new rule, facilities already required to obtain Clean 
Air Act operating permits must also “include GHGs in their permit if they increase these emissions by at least 
75,000 tons per year (tpy).” Id.   
 141. Id. The second phase limits coverage to large stationary GHG emitters—i.e., new facilities emitting at 
least 100,000 tpy, as well as all modifications to existing facilities that effectively increase GHG emissions by at 
least 75,000 tpy. Id.  
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facilities must use the “best available control technologies” to control their GHG 
emissions.142 
The EPA announced the GHG permitting rule following a joint April rule-
making with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) that 
establishes a national GHG emissions standard for light-duty vehicles, such as 
passenger cars and light trucks.143 The joint rule aims to substantially reduce GHG 
emissions and improve fuel economy in light-duty vehicles by setting stringent CO2 
tailpipe standards for vehicles manufactured between model years 2012 and 2016.144 
According to the agencies, this rule is consistent with President Obama’s agenda to 
address global climate change.145 
iv. the european union’s environmental disclosure system 
The E.U. has adopted a comprehensive approach to corporate environmental 
reporting with its Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (“EMAS”).146 EMAS is a 
voluntary program premised on offering participants marketplace advantage 
incentives.147 Unlike the U.S. disclosure system, which serves to ensure the validity 
and adequacy of financial investment information made available to the public, the 
E.U.’s EMAS program offers a mutually beneficial arrangement for both investors 
and the community’s environmental objectives as it aims to improve the way a 
company addresses environmental matters while providing direct benefits to 
participating organizations.148 Participants agree to meet specific criteria in exchange 
for the benefits of limited regulatory controls.149 For example, corporate participants 
must first conduct a thorough environmental review, assessing the issues, impact, 
and performance of each industrial site—i.e., property on which a company carries 

 142. Id. 
 143. See id.; see also U.S. EPA, EPA AND NHTSA FINALIZE HISTORIC NATIONAL PROGRAM TO REDUCE 
GREENHOUSE GASES AND IMPROVE FUEL ECONOMY FOR CARS AND TRUCKS 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/oms/climate/regulations/420f10014.pdf [hereinafter U.S. EPA, EPA AND NHTSA].  
 144. U.S. EPA, EPA AND NHTSA, supra note 143, at 1. The EPA estimates that the national GHG tailpipe 
emissions program will achieve an approximately 21 percent reduction in GHG emissions by 2030. Light-Duty 
Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 
25,324, 25,328 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts 85, 86, 600, and at 49 C.F.R. pts 531, 533, 536, 537, 
538). 
 145. See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. at 25,324 (“This joint Final Rule is consistent with the National Fuel Efficiency Policy 
announced by President Obama on May 19, 2009, responding to the country’s critical need to address global 
climate change and to reduce oil consumption.”). 
 146. Case, supra note 80, at 402. 
 147. See EUROPA, Environment, EMAS, Executive Summary, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/ 
about/summary_en.htm (last visited May 19, 2010) [hereinafter EUROPA, Executive Summary]. 
 148. Bray, supra note 20, at 664. 
 149. Case, supra note 80, at 402 (noting that participants receive the benefit of limited regulatory controls in 
exchange for adhering to environmental auditing and reporting standards). 
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out its industrial activities.150 From the review, companies develop environmental 
policy statements, initiate an “environmental programme” for each enrolled site, 
and create an environmental management system for each site.151 Participants must 
conduct internal environmental audits for each site every three years and subject 
each program site to external audits by independent environmental “verifiers.”152 
Finally, and probably most importantly, companies enrolled in the program must 
disclose the verified audit results to the public by way of standardized 
“environmental statements.”153 As of 2001, all public and private corporations are 
eligible to participate in EMAS.154 
By implementing EMAS, the European Commission recognized that 
“[e]nvironmental concerns, growing public pressure and regulatory measures are 
changing the way people do business around the world.”155 Benefits under EMAS 
include increased customer confidence, improved compliance with environmental 
legislation, sustained competitiveness by meeting customer demands for en-
vironmental management, lower costs, and less regulation.156 Costs of the program 
include external costs, registration fees, and internal costs associated with 
implementing and maintaining the program.157 
v. analysis 
Although many federal environmental laws now require companies to report 
compliance with federal environmental standards, financial disclosure of risks 
associated with environmental compliance is virtually nonexistent and far from 
adequate.158 Moreover, in light of growing efforts by states and the federal 
government to address climate change concerns,159 the environmental regulatory 
landscape will likely grow even more complex.160 Consequently, corporate managers 
will face additional environmental risks and potential liabilities.161 Policymakers and 

 150. Bray, supra note 20, at 664–65. 
 151. Id. at 665. 
 152. Id. at 665–66. 
 153. Id. at 666–67. 
 154. Surya Deva, Sustainable Good Governance and Corporations: An Analysis of Asymmetries, 18 GEO. INT’L 
ENVTL. L. REV. 707, 734 (2006) (noting that EMAS has been available since 1995 but was originally restricted to 
industrial-sector companies). 
 155. EUROPA, Executive Summary, supra note 147.  
 156. EUROPA, Environment, EMAS, Frequently Asked Questions, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/ 
tools/faq_en.htm#benefits (last visited May 19, 2010). 
 157. Id.  
 158. See THE CORPORATE LIBRARY, supra note 16, at 34. 
 159. Id. at 1–2. 
 160. See infra Part VI.A. 
 161. See Mark Latham, Environmental Liabilities and the Federal Securities Laws: A Proposal for Improved 
Disclosure of Climate Change-Related Risks, 39 ENVTL. L. 647, 661–62 (2009) (noting that regulation of GHG 
emissions under the Clean Air Act “would mean . . . that businesses would face a new set of highly complex state 
regulations that . . . would impose enormous compliance costs necessary to reduce carbon dioxide emissions”). 
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regulators can no longer ignore the need for heightened corporate disclosure 
requirements. This Comment argues that current corporate disclosure 
requirements with regard to environmental matters are outmoded in the face of  
climate change developments and must be updated to best serve investor interests 
while conferring corporate benefits.162 More specifically, Congress should amend the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, a legislative measure aimed at enhancing the quality of 
financial documents, to require that: (1) publicly traded companies disclose their 
GHG emissions as potential, material environmental risks; and (2) the SEC and 
EPA formally agree to share relevant information related to environmental risks.163 
A. Inadequate Environmental Disclosure Under the Materiality Standard 
Currently, federal securities laws maintain an element of management discretion on 
the issue of materiality.164 In the MD&A sections of financial filings, a registrant 
company must discuss “any known trends, or any known demands, commitments, 
events, or uncertainties” that, in the judgment of management, are reasonably likely 
to materially impact its liquidity, financial condition, or operating results.165 
Similarly, other items of Regulation S-K contain references to the materiality 
standard.166 The SEC has been reluctant to expand existing environmental reporting 
requirements to require the disclosure of risks and uncertainties beyond the TSC 
Industries materiality standard, however.167 In 2002, SEC regulators stated that “a 
matter should be disclosed in the MD&A unless the management has concluded 
that such [an] item cannot reasonably impose a material impact on the 
company.”168 Yet in 2003, the SEC reviewed the 2002 10-K annual reports of 
Fortune 500 companies and found generally inadequate reporting of environmental 
liabilities in MD&A sections.169 
In 2004, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) issued a report 
describing, inter alia, its assessment of the SEC’s environmental disclosure 
requirements, the extent of corporate environmental disclosures, and the SEC’s 
enforcement of compliance with disclosure requirements.170 The GAO found that 

 162. See infra Parts V.A–B. 
 163. See infra Part VI. 
 164. See supra Part II. 
 165. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2009). 
 166. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.101, 229.103 (including the materiality provisions of sections 101 and 103). 
 167. See Eric B. Rothenberg et al., Environmental Issues in Business Transactions Under U.S. Law, 5 WIS. 
ENVTL. L.J. 121, 147 (1998) (noting that within the insurance sector, the SEC has been reluctant to require full 
environmental disclosure, even in the quantity and types of environmental insurance claims, as well as estimates 
of associated costs to cover such claims). SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro has specifically stated that the SEC 
would not redefine its “long-standing interpretations of materiality.” Schapiro, supra note 85.  
 168. SANFORD LEWIS, TOXIC STOCK SYNDROME 8 (2008). 
 169. Schwartz & Mussio, Environmental Disclosure, supra note 52, at 286.  
 170. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-808, ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE: SEC SHOULD 
EXPLORE WAYS TO IMPROVE TRACKING AND TRANSPARENCY OF INFORMATION 2 (2004). 
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stakeholders disagreed as to the adequacy of the SEC’s disclosure requirements for 
environmental matters, with socially responsible investors objecting that the 
Commission’s requirements are too flexible and too narrowly scoped.171 Likewise, 
the GAO could not determine the extent to which companies disclosed 
environmental information because “researchers [had] no way of knowing what 
environmental information [was] (1) potentially subject to disclosure and (2) 
material in the context of a company’s specific circumstances” without direct access 
to company records.172 Finally, the GAO could not determine whether the SEC’s 
efforts to monitor and enforce corporate compliance with environmental disclosure 
requirements were adequate.173 
More recently, Ceres and the Environmental Defense Fund commissioned a 
study that examined the climate risk disclosures of 100 companies in the electric 
utilities, coal, oil and gas, transportation, and insurance industries.174 The study 
found very limited disclosure as “28 [companies] had no discussion of risk 
assessment, 52 described no actions to address climate change, and 59 made no 
mention of [GHG] emissions or a climate change position.”175 At best, the study 
qualitatively described the level of climate risk disclosure in any given industry 
sector as “fair.”176 Most filings across the five sectors “lacked the level of detail that 
investors require.”177 The study concluded that corporate climate risk disclosure is 
largely inadequate because “the SEC has failed to take actions to highlight its 
importance.”178 
The SEC has only recently spoken on the materiality of climate risks for the 
purposes of corporate disclosures with its February 2010 Release.179 SEC Chairman, 
Mary Schapiro, made it clear that the Release was simply intended “to provide 
clarity and enhance consistency” of reporting.180 The Release represents an 
improvement of, but not an adequate remedy for, corporate environmental 
disclosure woes.181 Because the Release neither creates nor modifies disclosure 
requirements, it serves to remind publicly traded companies of their obligation to 

 171. Id. at 9, 12. 
 172. Id. at 16. 
 173. Id. at 23. 
 174. THE CORPORATE LIBRARY, supra note 16, at 34. 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act Release No. 
9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61,469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,290 (Feb. 8, 2010). 
 180. Schapiro, supra note 85. 
 181. In addition to monitoring the impact of the February Release on corporate disclosures, the SEC plans 
to hold a public roundtable on climate change disclosures later this spring. Commission Guidance Regarding 
Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. at 6,297. The Commission has yet to determine “whether 
further guidance or rulemaking relating to climate change disclosure is necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors.” Id.  
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disclose material information to shareholders.182 The SEC goes one step further and 
officially adopts the position that risks associated with climate change and related 
developments may qualify as material information subject to disclosure.183 The 
Release gives examples of situations arising from climate change developments that 
may trigger an analysis of materiality.184 The question of disclosure, however, 
remains inextricably tied to the Commission’s long-standing interpretations of 
materiality.185 
Preceding the Release, government and stakeholder-sponsored studies con-
firmed what many scholars already concluded—that disclosure of environmental 
risks under the current materiality standard remains largely inadequate.186 As the 
SEC has indicated, however, that standard still applies today.187 Materiality hinges 
on the substantial likelihood that Joe the Investor would consider the fact-at-issue 
important enough to factor into his decision-making.188 Joe finds himself in good 
company these days as more investors voice their dissatisfaction with the level at 
which U.S. companies disclose their environmental risks, especially climate risks, to 
the SEC.189 The time has come for change, and as discussed below, better disclosure 
is better for everyone. 
B. Benefits of Communicating Risk 
Adequate disclosure of environmental risks can benefit both public companies and 
investors in several ways. For example, environmental risk disclosure can reflect a 
general corporate awareness for social and environmental responsibility.190 With 
more companies taking on the “green” initiative, socially responsible investors are 
likely to respond positively to the actions of environmentally responsible 

 182. See id.  
 183. See id. 
 184. See id. at 6,295–97. 
 185. Schapiro, supra note 85. 
 186. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. McFarland. Warming up to Climate Change Risk Disclosure, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & 
FIN. L. 281, 292–93 (2009) (“Researchers have decried the lack of meaningful public reporting on climate 
change risks. Several coalitions have engaged in efforts to improve climate change risk disclosure.” (footnote 
omitted)). See generally Mitchell F. Crusto, Endangered Green Reports: “Cumlative Materiality” in Corporate 
Environmental Disclosure After Sarbanes-Oxley, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483 (2005) (discussing the status and 
important shortfalls of corporate environmental disclosure under current federal securities laws and the 
materiality standard).  
 187. See Schapiro, supra note 85. 
 188. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).  
 189. See McFarland, supra note 186, at 303–06 (providing an overview of a petition to the SEC by “[a] 
collection of institutional investors, governmental officers, attorneys general, environmental organizations and 
non-profit groups” seeking “interpretive guidance for reporting climate change issues under existing mandatory 
disclosure rules and regulations”).  
 190. See Monsma & Olson, supra note 58, at 156 (“[I]t has long been argued that information about the 
social and environmental responsibilities of a company does not bear upon its financial condition or the 
economic value of an investment because such information is ethical, perhaps even self-serving, rather than 
financially relevant.”). 
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companies.191 Communication of risks would presumably lead to better-informed 
investor decision-making.192 By keeping the public well-informed through 
transparent reporting, companies can mitigate investors’ fears and apprehensions 
associated with uncertainty, particularly those companies most directly affected by 
the impact of climate change.193 As one scholar noted, a transparent market can also 
prevent corporate assets from being undervalued, and the accurate pricing of stocks 
can lead to decreased market volatility.194 
1. Benefits to Investors 
Shareholders benefit from greater disclosure because federal disclosure 
requirements are meant to protect investors.195 With regard to environmental 
matters, shareholders and institutional investors seem to favor greater disclosure of 
environmental risks, particularly those associated with climate change.196 The 
number of socially responsible investors who “specifically seek information about 
company management commitments and [social and environmental] 
performance” continues to grow.197 In fact, several financiers expressly invest in 
companies skilled in addressing environmental issues.198 Moreover, within the last 
decade, institutional investors have petitioned the SEC to issue interpretive 
guidance on when companies should disclose climate risks.199 For example, on 
November 23, 2009, a coalition of twenty institutional investors filed a 
supplemental petition to the SEC, asking the agency to further clarify what 
constitutes climate-related “material risks.”200 A company’s proper disclosure of 
known or anticipated material risks will in turn allow investors to fully assess the 

 191. See generally Alex Williams, Buying into the Green Movement, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, § 9, at 1 
(describing the green movement and the criticisms that call into question the supposed environmental benefits 
of green consumerism).  
 192. See infra Part V.B.1. 
 193. See Bray, supra note 20, at 668–69. Risk managers assume the responsibility of putting risks in 
perspective for the public by providing trusted expert opinions and explaining management actions to manage 
those risks. Id. at 669. 
 194. David A. Westbrook, Telling All: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Ideal of Transparency, 2004 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 441, 451–52 (positing that reduced volatility through consistently accurate stock pricing would 
“preclude[] the mania and correction that constitute financial crises”). 
 195. See Monsma & Olson, supra note 58, at 140–41 (“Over and over again, investors are said to be 
protected by the ‘full and fair disclosure of all material information.’”). 
 196. Martin, supra note 19, at 981–83; Katherine P. O’Halleran, Increased Scrutiny on Company Disclosure of 
Environmental Liabilities, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2005, at 72, 73. 
 197. See Monsma & Olson, supra note 58, at 160. 
 198. Thomas, supra note 31, at 902.  
 199. Martin, supra note 19, at 981–82 (“Since 2004, a group of institutional investors has been pushing the 
SEC to issue guidance on how and when companies should report risks associated with climate change.”). 
 200. Press Release, Investor Network on Climate Risk, Major Investors Call for SEC to Require Disclosure of 
Companies’ Climate Risks and Opportunities (Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.incr.com/Page.aspx?pid=1152.  
CHEN.PP3.DOC 6/14/2010  4:59 PM 
 Joey Tsu-Yi Chen 
vol. 5 no. 2 2010 347 
investment risks they are taking.201 The SEC issued its climate change disclosure 
interpretive guidance earlier this year in response to these investor petitions.202 
In the absence of adequate disclosure requirements, there is an asymmetry in 
information between investors and firms where investors face the disadvantage of 
not having all the facts necessary to determine a firm’s true value.203 Increased 
disclosure of risks can serve to level the playing field by promoting transparency, 
which in turn assists investors in making well-informed investment decisions.204 In a 
fully transparent market, investors “have all the information in the possession of the 
company” necessary to accurately value a security.205 Moreover, as markets become 
more transparent, their efficiency improves.206 The accurate valuation of securities 
leads to decreased market volatility, as “there is little reason to pay anything more, 
or less, than the asking price.”207 Greater transparency as a result of heightened risk 
disclosure also boosts investor confidence by minimizing the fear that they will be 
defrauded in the marketplace.208 Essentially, adequate environmental risk disclosure 
reduces investor risk and serves the public interest.209 
2. Benefits to Corporations 
Increased environmental risk disclosure requirements can also benefit corporations. 
First, adequate assessment and disclosure of risks for the purposes of public 
disclosure and accountability will likely prompt U.S. companies to conduct more 
critical analyses of their corporate behavior.210 For example, executive decision-
makers may conduct cost-benefit analyses and factor in the public response and 
consequences of their decisions, particularly if there is a chance their actions could 
lead to subsequent litigation or decreased investments.211 Since 2007, federal courts 

 201. See id. 
 202. Press Release, CSRwire, SEC Issues Ground-Breaking Guidance Requiring Corporate Disclosure of 
Material Climate Change Risks and Opportunities (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.csrwire.com/press/ 
press_release/28746. 
 203. See Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More 
Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 152–53 (2006) (explaining that disclosure 
can play a role in leveling the informational playing field so that investors have equal access to information and 
“can then make informed valuation judgments about the price of securities”). 
 204. Id. at 152–53. 
 205. Westbrook, supra note 194, at 448–49.  
 206. Id. at 449. 
 207. Id. at 451. 
 208. Ripken, supra note 203, at 154. 
 209. Id. at 155. 
 210. See Mark A. Sargent, A Sense of Order: The Virtues and Limits of Doctrinal Analysis, 104 HARV. L. REV. 
634, 639 (1990) (reviewing LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION (3d ed. 1989)). 
 211. See Barbara Ann White, Economic Efficiency and the Parameters of Fairness: A Marriage of Marketplace 
Morals and the Ethic of Care, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 69 (2005) (observing that disclosure-mediated 
transparency subjects companies to “public scrutiny and, in particular, to potential scrutiny by those 
representing impacted individuals,” such that managers are aware “they will be held accountable for their 
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have increasingly indicated that companies are no longer immune from climate 
change-related litigation.212 For example, in Connecticut v. American Electric Power 
Co., the Second Circuit allowed the state plaintiffs to sue six electric power 
companies over their operation of fossil-fuel-fired power plants in twenty states 
under the federal common law claim of public nuisance.213 A three-member panel of 
the Fifth Circuit appeared to follow in the steps of the Second Circuit in Comer v. 
Murphy Oil U.S.A.214 when it allowed a Mississippi class action public nuisance 
lawsuit to proceed against insurance, oil, coal, and chemical companies for their 
alleged contributions to property damages resulting from Hurricane Katrina.215 
While both cases have yet to be decided on their merits, the circuit rulings can 
potentially subject companies to new risks in environmental litigation.216 Because 
litigation is costly, both companies and plaintiffs may favor federal intervention by 
way of legislation regulating GHG emissions.217 
In addition to insulating companies from domestic public nuisance litigation, 
mandatory reporting can also benefit U.S.-registered corporate entities in the global 
marketplace. In light of the E.U.’s GHG Emission Trading System (“ETS”),218 the 
European community’s open trading market for GHG emissions,219 compliance 

decisions,” thereby constraining “the evaluation and selection process of corporate decisions”); Cynthia A. 
Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 
1278 (1999) (noting that a corporation’s conduct in violation of various domestic statutes can yield negative 
economic consequences such as “private litigation, government litigation, . . . reputational injuries, . . . and 
various corollary effects such as institutional investor disinvestment, bond devaluations, and negative market 
consequences,” which can not only affect the value of the company, but also its future economic performance).  
 212. See generally Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009) (allowing plaintiffs to 
proceed with their public nuisance lawsuit against six electric power companies for their alleged contributions 
to global warming). 
 213. Id. at 358 (“In this case, the States have properly asserted parens patriae standing with respect to a 
public nuisance, and the ‘serious magnitude’ of the nuisance caused by climate change, as it has been alleged, is 
apparent.”). 
 214. 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 215. Id. at 860–61, 879–80.  As this issue goes to print, the Fifth Circuit leaves uncertain the fate of the class 
action plaintiffs in Comer, following its announcement that the court lost quorum to hear the case en banc.  See 
supra note 19. 
 216. Koons, supra note 19. 
 217. See id.  
 218. EUROPA, Environment, Climate Change, Emission Trading System, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ 
climat/emission/index_en.htm (last visited May 19, 2010). ETS is the cap-and-trade program created by the 
E.U. to assist member states in their commitments to reduce GHG emissions pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol. 
Press Release, EUROPA, Questions & Answers on Emissions Trading and National Allocation Plans (June 20, 
2005), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/84&format=HTML& 
aged=1&language. This Comment does not attempt to discuss the merits of the ETS cap-and-trade program. 
For an assessment of ETS, including its controversies, see A. DENNY ELLERMAN & PAUL L. JOSKOW, PEW CTR. ON 
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM IN PERSPECTIVE (2008), 
available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/EU-ETS-In-Perspective-Report.pdf.  
 219. Created in 2005, Europe’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading program includes twenty-five member 
state participants and covers over 10,000 facilities in six industry sectors. THE CORPORATE LIBRARY, supra note 
16, at 1. 
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with domestic and foreign GHG disclosure requirements would allow U.S. 
companies to stay competitive in foreign markets.220 American multinational 
corporations that conduct a significant amount of business in these foreign markets 
incur additional regulatory risks because they are subject to international laws and 
rules aimed at reducing GHG emissions.221 In fact, U.S. companies must assimilate 
into these foreign cap-and-trade systems or face substantial profit losses from 
possible exclusion from these markets.222 Scholars have pointed to empirical 
research suggesting that greater disclosure would allow companies to expand their 
presence in broader markets through attracting new investors.223 According to one 
business school professor, “companies from low-disclosure jurisdictions that list on 
exchanges with higher disclosure requirements tend to benefit substantially.”224 
Additionally, heightened foreign disclosure requirements can significantly 
impact U.S. companies that operate within the carbon or fossil fuel supply chain 
through supply chain disruption.225 Consider the disruption to domestic U.S. 
companies’ performance if a supplier operating in European markets fails to 
properly disclose GHG emissions under the E.U.’s ETS and is subsequently 
removed from the marketplace.226 Were the U.S. companies suddenly left to find 
another supplier, the resulting commitment of time and resources to restore the 
supply chain would lead to costly delays, and perhaps a loss of profits, or a drop in 
stock prices, or both.227 Therefore, companies should identify and subsequently 
disclose such supply chain-related risks so that they may develop proactive 
strategies for managing those risks and remain competitive,228 especially when 
investors appear to want more environmental disclosure.229 
Both investors and publicly traded companies stand to benefit from greater 
corporate environmental disclosures and the increase in market transparency that 

 220. Cf. LEWIS, supra note 168, at 27 (noting that failure by companies affected by the E.U. REACH 
program, which regulates toxic chemicals in European markets, to disclose or pre-register certain chemicals and 
substances covered under REACH will lead to product exclusion from E.U. markets). 
 221. Latham, supra note 161, at 662–63. 
 222. Cf. LEWIS, supra note 168, at 22 (noting that a U.S. Company like Dow Chemical would be affected by 
the E.U.’s REACH program, as “European markets represent 36 percent of Dow Chemical’s sales and 10 percent 
of the company’s assets, yet the company’s 2007 10-K filing does not discuss the potential impact of REACH.”). 
 223. Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 823 (2006). 
 224. Id. 
 225. Cf. LEWIS, supra note 168, at 29 (concluding that for chemical companies, failure to disclose supply 
chain risks leaves companies ill-prepared and likely to suffer significant business disruptions). 
 226. See supra note 220. 
 227. See Trevor W. Nagel & Elizabeth M. Kelley, The Impact of Globalization on Structuring, Implementing, 
and Advising on Sourcing Arrangements, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 619, 620 n.4 (2007) (“[A] single error in one part . . . 
of a complex supply chain can create large, rippling effects on a company’s global sales and distribution 
operations.”). 
 228. See id.  
 229. See McFarland, supra note 186, at 281–82 (“Despite repeated requests from investor groups for more 
disclosure, and despite increasing public interest in the effects of global warming, poor disclosure persists.”). 
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would follow.230 Greater disclosure can result in the accurate market valuation of 
corporate stocks, which, as some suggest, can lead to increased market stability.231 
As the number of socially responsible investors who look to and depend on 
corporate environmental disclosures continues to grow, so does the incentive for 
companies to disclose fully their environmental risks.232 Investors see good 
corporate citizenship, and companies remain competitive in the marketplace.233 
C. Voluntary Reporting vs. Mandatory Reporting 
Whether the government should require companies to report environmental risks 
or simply encourage it depends on the likelihood that the policy will achieve the 
desired effect. If the government opted for a voluntary reporting system, the burden 
of “environmental reform” would shift to corporate entities.234 While the E.U.’s 
EMAS has had some successes, it is only fair to mention that systems based on 
voluntary reporting are not without weaknesses or criticism.235 At least one legal 
scholar has observed that while EMAS compels more comprehensive environmental 
reporting than the vague “materiality” standard in U.S. federal securities laws, 
participation in the EMAS program has been “underwhelming.”236 One reason is a 
lack of adequate incentives or external market rewards to participate in the 
program.237 Furthermore, participants enrolled in the program have taken issue with 
the reporting commitment under the program.238 While the EMAS program has 
responded to the reporting concerns, scholars continue to doubt the “long-term 
viability of . . . [such] a voluntary policy instrument.”239 
Scholars have also noted that even within the U.S. mandatory “materiality” 
reporting scheme, corporate efforts to voluntarily disclose environmental 
performance have been largely without reform effect.240 As one law professor 
commented, companies tend to selectively disclose aspects of their environmentally 
related actions in the form of a “green report”—namely, a “glossy, unaudited 

 230. See Westbrook, supra note 194, at 453 (“[W]e should understand mandatory disclosure regimes as the 
regulatory effort to increase transparency and thereby increase informational efficiency of markets. As the 
transparency of a market increases, and all else being equal, we should see a decrease in trading volume and in 
volatility.”). 
 231. See id. at 448–49. 
 232. See Monsma & Olson, supra note 58, at 160 (“Regardless of what level of disclosure the law demands, 
the market is demanding far more social and environmental disclosure today.”). 
 233. Id. at 196. 
 234. See Bray, supra note 20, at 669. 
 235. Case, supra note 80, at 403. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id.  
 238. Id. at 405. 
 239. Id. at 403–04. 
 240. See Crusto, supra note 186, at 500. 
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showcase of corporate environmental good deeds.”241 These reports are often 
misleading and geared toward favorably influencing investors and public opinion.242 
Such voluntary disclosure can lead to “greenwashing”—where a company 
misleadingly presents an environmentally responsible image when its activities are 
less than environmentally friendly.243 Collectively, these doubts would suggest that a 
mandatory reporting requirement would better facilitate the promotion of 
corporate-led environmental reform. 
Requiring environmental risk disclosure would allow the SEC to shore up gaps 
and weaknesses in the existing federal reporting scheme.244 Studies indicate that the 
current U.S. “materiality” reporting scheme is far from adequate.245 Stricter 
mandatory disclosure requirements would not only circumvent the ambiguity of 
the materiality standard,246 but also provide investors and stakeholders with more 
information.247 Instead of relying on managerial discretion for materiality, 
companies could in fact make full disclosures of their environmental risks and 
liabilities. While mandatory disclosures would likely be more costly to companies,248 
some scholars believe that mandatory reporting can result in market-enhancing 
benefits such as “improv[ing] the monitoring capability of third parties, reduc[ing] 
the costs for investors, and thereby lower[ing] the price for firms that raise 
capital[,]” as well as increased venture capital financing.249 
Additionally, mandatory reporting requirements can help ensure that investors 
receive information that is both uniform and comparable. The difficulty in SEC 
enforcement of existing environmental disclosure requirements may be due to the 
fact that much discretion has been given to corporate managers, creating a lack of 
uniformity in reporting. Thus, some have argued that because there is no clear duty 
to disclose,250 there is discrepancy in the information companies choose to disclose 
to investors.251 This puts investors at a disadvantage because they are unable to fully 
compare information from different companies.252 Mandatory reporting can help 

 241. Id. at 483. 
 242. See id. at 483, 500. 
 243. Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, Greenwash, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Summer 2007, at 9, 9.  
 244. See, e.g., Latham, supra note 161, at 702–03 (concluding that the current SEC regulatory framework 
fails to ensure adequate disclosure of climate change risk).  
 245. See, e.g., THE CORPORATE LIBRARY, supra note 16, at 34. 
 246. See Monsma & Olson, supra note 58, at 140 (“Not surprisingly, courts are repeatedly asked to resolve 
legal disagreements regarding the duty to disclose and the definition of materiality.”). 
 247. See Prentice, supra note 223, at 823 (“[E]mpirical studies strongly suggest that mandatory disclosure 
works . . . because it generally results in increased disclosure.”). 
 248. See id. at 816 (noting that mandatory disclosure is “admittedly costly”). 
 249. See, e.g., id. at 820–23 (footnote omitted). 
 250. See, e.g., Monsma & Olson, supra note 58, at 161 (stating that a lack of uniformity in existing corporate 
disclosures is “due in part to the widely held perception that such disclosure is voluntary and that there is no 
duty to report this information as yet”). 
 251. Id. at 174. 
 252. Id. 
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level the playing field and improve the quality and efficiency of information made 
available to assist investors in their decision-making.253 
vi. recommendations 
While SOX generated momentum shortly after Congress enacted it, the Act does 
not specifically address corporate environmental disclosure.254 Perhaps it should. 
Existing provisions of SOX have been touted to “arm[] the public with a great 
hammer to redress material omissions and misstatements in environmental 
disclosures.”255 Given the previously discussed concerns over the SEC’s reluctance to 
expand environmental disclosure requirements, the time has come to give the 
“great hammer” teeth. In particular, concerns over global warming and climate 
change have taken center stage,256 giving rise to a number of legislative and 
regulatory initiatives to reduce GHG emissions.257 The growing complexities of 
environmental compliance calls for congressional action to amend SOX to not only 
mandate corporate disclosure of climate risks but also ensure that the SEC and EPA 
collaborate efficiently to enforce these disclosure requirements.258 
A. The Changing Regulatory Landscape 
With the Obama Administration committed to mitigating the effects of climate 
change,259 and the EPA beginning to regulate GHG emissions,260 it seems inevitable 
that a national cap-and-trade policy will soon follow.261 In fact, legislation currently 
pending before the 111th Congress aspires to reduce global warming pollution by 
proposing, among other things, a trading scheme for GHGs.262 H.R. 2454, or the 
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (“ACES”), would direct the EPA 

 253. See Prentice, supra note 223, at 819–20 (“Mandatory disclosure reduces search and information 
processing costs for investors by requiring cheap, readily available, standardized, and relatively reliable 
disclosure of information. Required disclosure . . . is needed to help defeat strategic disclosure.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 254. Crusto, supra note 186, at 484–85. 
 255. Id. at 500. 
 256. Erich Birch, Air Quality Regulation in the United States, BUS. L. TODAY, July/Aug. 2007, at 13, 17 
(“[T]he issue of climate change is now on center stage in scientific, political, and policy arenas.”). 
 257. THE CORPORATE LIBRARY, supra note 16, at 1–2. 
 258. See infra Part VI.B. 
 259. John M. Broder, Obama Affirms Climate Change Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/us/politics/19climate.html. 
 260. See supra Part III. 
 261. See Schwartz & Mussio, Due Diligence, supra note 56, at 252 (“[I]t now appears likely that Congress will 
pass federal greenhouse gas emissions regulation in the form of a cap and trade system, as favored by President 
Obama.”). 
 262. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.; Clean Energy Jobs and 
American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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to cap GHG emissions (by annual tonnage) for specific activities.263 Emitters 
covered under ACES may not exceed their allowances, though they may obtain and 
trade offset credits.264 Similarly in the U.S. Senate, Senators John Kerry and Barbara 
Boxer introduced a bill bearing close resemblance to H.R. 2454, on September 30, 
2009.265 Known as the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act,266 S. 1733 called 
for a greater reduction of GHG emissions than its House counterpart but also 
provided for an allowance and offset trading system.267 S. 1733 is no longer active,268 
but Senator Kerry and Senator Joe Lieberman recently introduced a new energy and 
climate change bill—the American Power Act—which targets both energy and 
environmental issues and includes, among other things, a carbon emissions 
allowance and trading scheme.269 The bill also purports to set mandatory limits on 
GHG emissions.270 
If enacted, the proposed climate change legislation would obligate covered 
entities to disclose additional environmental information—e.g., GHG emissions—
under the current “materiality” standard.271 After all, full disclosure of GHG 
emissions would be part and parcel to a market for emissions allowances and thus 

 263. H.R. 2454 §§ 721–728 (describing the emissions allowance program). Entities covered under global 
warming provisions of the bill include: all electricity sources; all stationary sources for petroleum-based or coal-
based liquid fuel, petroleum coke, or natural gas liquid; stationary sources that deal in any of the enumerated 
GHGs; stationary sources that emit above a certain tonnage of carbon dioxide equivalent of nitrogen trifluoride; 
any geologic sequestration site; stationary sources in certain industrial manufacturing or production sectors; 
certain chemical or petrochemical stationary sources; certain fossil fuel-fired combustion devices; qualifying 
stationary sources involved in ethanol production, ferroalloy production, fluorinated gas production, food 
processing, glass production, hydrogen production, iron and steel production, lead production, pulp and paper 
manufacturing, and zinc production; and qualifying natural gas local distributors. Id. § 700(13). 
 264. Id. §§ 722–724. 
 265. See Govtrack.us, S. 1733: Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, http://www.govtrack.us/ 
congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-1733 (last visited May 15, 2010). 
 266. Id. 
 267. See NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, S. 1733, CLEAN ENERGY JOBS & AMERICAN POWER ACT OF 2009: 
OVERVIEW OF BILL RELEASED 9/30/09, at 1–2 (2009), http://fairclimateproject.org/blog/wp-content/ 
uploads/NWF_S.1733_overview.pdf; Jim Snyder, Senate Panel Passes Climate Bill as Republicans Continue 
Boycott, THE HILL, Nov. 5, 2009, http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/66519-senate-panel-passes-climate-bill-
as-gop-boycotts (noting that the Senate bill calls for a larger reduction in GHG emissions than the House 
climate bill and that companies could buy permits to meet emissions targets). 
 268. Patrick Tutwiler, Climate Change Legislation: Where Does It Stand?, GOVTRACK INSIDER, Apr. 27, 2010, 
http://www.govtrackinsider.com/articles/2010-04-27/climate-change. 
 269. Darren Samuelsohn, Kerry, Lieberman to End the Suspense with Climate Bill Rollout Today, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/05/12/12climatewire-kerry-lieberman-to-end-the-suspense 
-with-cli-19936.html?pagewanted=1. 
 270. Id. 
 271. See Bernie Hawkins et al., Disclosing Environmental Liabilities, BUS. L. TODAY, July/August 2009, at 61, 
63 (noting that under a prior legislative attempt to create a national cap-and-trade GHG emissions program, 
the SEC would have been required to “issue interpretive releases under Items 101 and 303 of Regulation S-K 
clarifying that commitments to lower greenhouse gas emissions [were] considered material and that global 
warming is a known trend”). 
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information that a reasonable investor would want to know.272 But what about 
companies outside the scope of the proposed trading scheme—how can the 
materiality standard ensure adequate disclosure of their climate risks? The shifting 
regulatory landscape is likely to have the greatest impact on the energy sector, since 
energy-producing facilities tend to be among the largest emitters of GHGs.273 
Because the costs of compliance with these new climate change regulations can be 
substantial,274 one can expect the increased energy costs to affect the economy at 
large.275 Thus, there is a need for businesses to disclose these climate risks and 
liabilities to investors so they can adequately assess the value of the companies in 
which they are investing. 
Whether through new legislation or SOX, the stage is set for companies to 
disclose their climate risks. Particularly with regard to GHG emissions, participants 
in a cap-and-trade program, if Congress creates one, will not be able to escape the 
materiality of disclosing their emissions276—even if Congress chooses to do nothing 
more with SOX specifically. Congress should, however, consider amending SOX 
regardless of how legislators proceed on the cap-and-trade proposals. 
B. Mandatory Disclosure of GHG Emissions and Climate Risk 
Even if Congress declines to establish an emissions trading scheme at this time, 
amending SOX to require mandatory disclosure of climate risks will help protect 
investors in a regulatory landscape that is expanding in response to global warming 
and the need to regulate GHG emissions. Given that a number of states have already 
taken the initiative to limit GHG emissions and/or mitigate climate change in other 
ways,277 new federal regulations appear to be forthcoming.278 Because SOX purposely 
aims to “protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate 
disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws,”279 Congress should amend SOX to 
mandate corporate disclosure of risks and liabilities related to climate change. 

 272. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, § 713, 111th Cong.  
 273. Latham, supra note 161, at 663. 
 274. Id. (noting that as the nation moves toward reducing GHG emissions, the regulatory risks to businesses 
increase, which will lead to “a material increase in costs to businesses”). For example, major emitters of GHG 
pollutants may need to install expensive control equipment in order to achieve the necessary reductions in 
GHGs; others may need to pursue costly modifications. Id.  
 275. Id. (“The additional regulatory costs will . . . be passed along to consumers of energy, with large 
customers—businesses—shouldering substantially higher energy costs.”). 
 276. See supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
 277. See Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act Release No. 
9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61,469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,290, 6,290 n.7 (Feb. 8, 2010). For example, twenty-three 
states are participating partners in three different regional GHG initiative programs. Id.  
 278. Latham, supra note 161, at 652 (noting that new sweeping federal regulations to GHG emissions are 
inevitable). 
 279. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C. (2006)). 
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Understandably, the scope of climate risk remains broad despite efforts to 
classify the risks into general categories.280 Although the SEC has since provided 
guidance on circumstances posing climate change-related risks that may trigger the 
need for corporate disclosure, such disclosure still hinges on materiality. 
Alternatively, Congress can directly require companies to report GHG emissions in 
their SEC filings. Notably, the EPA has already adopted a mandatory reporting rule 
for GHG emissions from certain industries and activities.281 Thus, the EPA has 
already detailed both the metrics and guidelines for monitoring and reporting gas 
emissions,282 so corporate disclosure of the same information should be 
straightforward. However, the EPA’s mandatory reporting rule does not actually 
regulate or limit GHG emissions.283 The agency has only recently taken steps to 
regulate GHG emissions from the largest stationary emitters and from the 
transportation sector.284 Still, corporate managers not directly affected by the new 
rules may question the necessity of disclosing their GHG emissions on the basis of 
materiality. Thus, specifically amending SOX to require disclosure of GHG 
emissions to the SEC in corporate financial statements is a logical step.285 
Finally, Congress should also amend SOX to authorize and direct the SEC to 
enter into a formal agreement with the EPA to share information. Presently, these 
two agencies lack such an arrangement,286 which has led to a suboptimal exchange of 
information, particularly information related to enforcement of environmental 
compliance.287 As the GAO observed in its 2004 report, the exchange of information 
broke down in part because the SEC did not find facility-specific data particularly 
useful when it could not readily identify the parent company.288 As some individuals 
have already observed, there is a compatibility issue between the EPA’s tracking 
method and that of the SEC, lending to the argument that the agencies need to 
streamline data sharing.289 The SEC previously indicated that it would consider 
taking better advantage of EPA data.290 Thus, a formal agreement to exchange 

 280. THE CORPORATE LIBRARY, supra note 16, at 2–3; see supra text accompanying note 17.  
 281. See supra Part III. 
 282. See generally Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, 56,288–90 (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pts 86, 87, 89, 90, 94, 98, 1033, 1039, 1042, 1045, 1048, 1051, 1054, 1065). 
 283. Id. at 52,260 (“The rule does not require control of greenhouse gases, rather it requires only that 
sources above certain threshold levels monitor and report emissions.”). 
 284. See supra Part III. 
 285. Latham, supra note 161, at 652. 
 286. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 170, at 28. 
 287. While the EPA at one time provided the SEC with enforcement-related data on a quarterly basis, now, 
“information sharing occurs less frequently and is focused on specific legal proceedings, such as those involving 
monetary sanctions for environmental violations.” Id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Michael J. Viscuso, Note, Scrubbing the Books Green: A Temporal Evaluation of Corporate Environmental 
Disclosure Requirements, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 891 (2007) (noting that experts have already made this 
streamlining argument).  
 290. Monsma & Olson, supra note 58, at 153. 
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information would prompt the agencies to seek ways to resolve the data sharing 
problem, which would ultimately improve the coordination between the SEC and 
EPA.291 As the principal federal environmental regulatory agency, the EPA can 
greatly assist the SEC in its enforcement of corporate compliance with heightened 
environmental disclosure requirements under the proposed amendments to SOX. 
vii. conclusion 
Corporate disclosures of environmental risks are grossly inadequate under current 
federal securities laws, while foreign governments, such as the E.U., have recognized 
and adopted systems that encourage companies to report certain environmental 
risks in the marketplace.292 That said, the U.S. reporting scheme is not without some 
mandatory environmental disclosure requirements.293 There is, however, a big 
catch—an unclear threshold of “materiality” that must be met before these 
requirements are triggered.294 While the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley has led to 
improved corporate governance and accountability, the shift toward increased 
activism by socially responsible investors and recent legislative and regulatory 
efforts to mitigate GHG emissions necessitate a tightening of corporate 
requirements for the dissemination of environmental risk information to the 
public.295 Greater access to this information will help protect investors more 
effectively, as well as ensure that businesses remain competitive.296 This Comment 
posits a statutory mechanism by which the SEC may promulgate more effective 
rules and regulations to address a long-standing problem that, out of necessity, 
must be addressed in order to help the United States economy better respond to a 
changing global environment. 
 

 291. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 170, at 23 (observing only sporadic efforts made by 
the EPA and SEC to coordinate improving environmental disclosure).  
 292. See supra Part IV. 
 293. See supra Part II. 
 294. See supra Part II. 
 295. See supra Part IV.B. 
 296. See supra Part IV.B. 
